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1. Introduction 
 
Readers will certainly find in this recent volume a most timely work that 
stresses the importance that non-verbal phenomena and elements lying between the 
linguistic and non-linguistic, the coded and non-coded, have in communication. 
Thus, Wharton undoubtedly redresses the balance in their favour after decades in 
which they have been incomprehensively relegated to a second plane in linguistics 
and other neighbouring disciplines. By exploring what and how such phenomena 
and elements contribute to communication, he brings to the pragmatic arena a wide 
range of items that have often met controversial accounts or escaped systematic 
linguistic description but, particularly, missed pragmatic unitary explanations. The 
following sections summarise each of the chapters this volume comprises, after 
which follows a critical evaluation. 
 
 
2. “Natural Pragmatics” 
 
The book opens with this introductory chapter (: 1-17), where Wharton starts 
by clearly explaining the reasons that encouraged him to write this most interesting 
work: controlled or unconscious vocal, facial and bodily gestures –which he refers 
to as ‘natural non-verbal behaviours– are omnipresent in human communication 
and largely contribute to or bias our understanding of discourse. Although they 
have been approached from different frameworks, such as functionalism, 
conversational and discourse analysis, sociology or anthropology, they have not 
been approached from a cognitive perspective that unveils how they might interact 
with linguistic properties of utterances. Such an approach must answer the 
following questions: 
a) What is the relation between natural non-verbal behaviours and 
intentional communication? 
b) How are non-verbal behaviours interpreted? 
c) What do they convey? 
d) What is the relation between natural non-verbal behaviours and those non-
verbal behaviours that are not natural? (: 3-4) 
The answers to these questions depend on the definitions of notions such as 
natural, language, pragmatics and communication, so Wharton explains his 
conceptions thereof. Based on Grice (1957), he applies the term ‘natural’ to the 
way in which non-verbal communication means, and takes ‘natural meaning’ to be 
synonymous with ‘naturally indicates’, as opposed to ‘non-natural meaning’, often 
used to refer to arbitrary or conventional meaning. By ‘language’, he understands 
an Internal, Individual, Intensional object consisting of a mentally represented 
grammar governed by innately determined principles, so he adheres to the 
cognitive, Chomskyan view. Finally, as regards ‘pragmatics’ and ‘communication’, 
Wharton adopts the relevance-theoretic approach to language use, which centres on 
ostensive-inferential communication and the processes taking place in 
comprehension (Sperber and Wilson 1986, 1995).  
 
 
3. “Natural and non-natural meaning” 
 
The second chapter (: 18-37) begins with a section dedicated to Gricean 
meaningNN. Wharton argues that, for Grice, cases of meaningNN contain a basic 
layer constituted by information pointed out, which cannot be derivable without a 
second layer of information that amounts to the intentional pointing of that first 
layer of information. He also comments on the tests devised by Grice to distinguish 
between cases of meaningN and meaningNN – paraphrasing and directly quoting (: 
21-22). Next follows a section where Wharton challenges the Gricean description 
of meaningNN as requiring an intended response from the audience, the audience’s 
recognition of the intention to produce that response, the communicator’s intention 
that the audience recognises the intention to produce that response and the 
audience’s recognition of the communicator’s intention to produce a desired 
response. He also characterises intentional communication as “[…] deliberate and 
open […]” (: 29) in the sense that the communicator lets the audience know 
something and encourages them to think that she has done so for some reason. 
Thus, he distinguishes it from mere cases of showing, in which there is no real 
intention or reason on the part of the communicator to communicate anything, 
although the audience may draw their own conclusions. Wharton concludes this 
chapter by claiming that behaviours that can be regarded as cases of meaningN can 
be deliberately shown and “[…] recruited for use in overt intentional 
communication” (: 33). 
4. “Pragmatics and the domain of pragmatic principles” 
 
The third chapter (: 38-69) opens with a section that summarises some of the 
basic tenets and fundamental claims of relevance theory (Sperber and Wilson 1986, 
1995): the cognitive principle of relevance, the notions of relevance, informative 
intention, cognitive environment, strong and weak communication and strong and 
weak implicature. As a consequence of the different ways wherewith 
communicators make manifest their informative intention, Wharton proposes the 
existence of a continuum of cases between showing and meaningNN, at one extreme 
of which are cases of purely spontaneous showing, while at its other extreme are 
cases of authentic linguistic coding. In between lies a wide variety of cases in 
which more or less direct/‘natural’ and indirect/‘coded’ evidence mix to various 
degress (: 43-47). 
Then, Wharton addresses the problem of the semantic underdeterminacy of 
utterances and explains the relevance-theoretic notion of explicature and its 
implications for pragmatic theory. Since the conceptual structures obtained by 
decoding may be so imprecise not only at the sentence level, but at word level too, 
they must be inferentially developed, adjusted or ‘fine-tuned’. Openly shown 
natural behaviours, like shivers, intonation or gaze direction, Wharton argues, may 
affect the outcome of the processes of lexical adjustment taking place when 
explicatures are developed, thus contributing to explicit truth-conditional content 
and guiding hearers to certain conclusions (: 51). In other cases, such behaviours 
convey attitudinal information, which may also be conveyed in a more explicit way 
by recourse to linguistic elements, such as sentential adverbs, which involve 
encoding. For this reason, natural behaviours also contribute to higher-level 
explicatures, but in a less explicit way.  
Finally, Wharton introduces the distinction between translational and non-
translational activation of concepts, parallel to the relevance-theoretic distinction 
between conceptual and procedural meaning/expressions/encoding (e.g. 
Blakemore 1987, 2002), and reminiscent of the speech-act-theoretic between 
describing and indicating (Austin 1962; Searle 1969). Translational activation of 
concepts is based on the existence and usage of a code, and amounts to triggering 
off a concept when decoding takes place. However, whereas the notion of 
procedural meaning/expressions/encoding amounts to instructions constraining the 
comprehension process by reducing the search space for relevant interpretations, 
non-translational activation “[…] does contain a coded element that points the 
hearer in a direction they would not reliably take unless they knew the code” (: 61). 
This new distinction suggests a reinterpretation of procedural encoding in terms 
not just of instructions, but of “[…] the management of levels of activation (e.g. of 
conceptual representations, computations or expectations” (: 65), and of procedural 
expressions as involving different activations: inferential rules, conceptual 
representations (e.g. contextual assumptions or classes of candidate referent), or 
expectations of particular types of cognitive effects (: 65).  
 
 
5. “Interjections and Language” 
 
Wharton applies some this new distinction and his showing-meaningNN 
continuum to the analysis of interjections in Chapter 4 (: 70-106). His major aim in 
this chapter is to answer these three questions:  
a) What do interjections communicate? 
b) How do interjections communicate? 
c) Are interjections part of language?  
The author starts by mentioning the controversy between the conceptualist and 
the non-conceptualist views of interjections, describing the major types of 
interjections –primary and secondary– and suggesting two general criteria to 
characterise them. Then, he discusses the problems he finds in the conceptualist 
approach: (i) difficulties to find satisfactory definitions for interjections, (ii) their 
vagueness, (iii) their context-dependence, (iv) their naturalness and spontaneity, (v) 
their lack of appropriate synonymous conceptual counterparts, and (vi) their non-
truth-conditional nature. These problems lead him to claim that interjections are 
not conceptual elements.  
In the following sections, Wharton reviews anthropologist E. Goffman’s (1981) 
description of interjections as response cries, his classification of them and his 
proposal concerning a continuum between properly linguistic and non-linguistic 
response cries, or between ‘displaying’ and ‘saying’ –similar to Wharton’s 
showing-meaningNN continuum– although Goffman’s differs in that it seems “[…] 
to be based on the assumption that all communication involves at least some 
element of coding” (: 83). Even if Wharton assesses Goffman’s contribution 
positively, he criticises Goffman for not addressing how interjections communicate 
or present a clear alternative to the conceptualist approach (: 84). For this reason, 
he then explores the possibility that interjections are analysed as non-truth-
conditional indicators of “[…] higher-level explicatures containing the type of 
speech-act or propositional-attitude information the hearer is expected to infer” (: 
85). Thus, he seeks to find an answer to the question about what interjections 
communicate.  
However, this analysis also poses some problems and seems quite restrictive, 
for interjections do not always appear in discourse with adjacent propositions that 
could yield the lower-level explicatures to be subsequently embedded under 
higher-level explicatures (: 87-88). Based on Rey’s (1980) work on emotional 
states, feelings and sensations, he states that the question about what interjections 
communicate requires different answers: in some cases, they would convey 
information exploitable for higher-level explicatures; in other cases, emotional 
attitudes to propositions and not propositional-attitude or speech-act descriptions, 
and, finally, in other cases, feelings or sensations (: 88-89).  
Next, he turns to the question about how interjections communicate. Since 
interjections do not pass the tests about conceptuality, he suggests a procedural 
analysis, according to which interjections “[…] encode procedural information 
which ‘points’ in the general direction in which relevance should be sought” (: 90). 
The procedures interjections encode, Wharton says, activate “[…] various 
attitudinal concepts or classes of concepts, but not in the standard translational 
way” (: 90). Accordingly, wow might activate attitudinal descriptions having to do 
with delight, surprise or excitement; eh a variety of interrogative propositional-
attitude descriptions; huh dissociative attitudes, etc. Prosodic information and 
paralinguistic information would determine the particular attitude involved and its 
intensity. With this proposal Wharton both resolves the problems the conceptualist 
account has and preserves the intuitions that interjections have a coded element and 
are more than natural displays (: 91).  
In order to answer the question whether interjections are part of language, the 
author takes into account their ‘paralinguistic’ nature, which places some of them 
close to gestures; their phonological atypicality, which prevents some of them from 
being reported by verbs of saying, and their syntactic independence and non-
productivity. He concludes that interjections constitute such a heterogeneous 
category, that a satisfactory answer cannot be given. Finally, Wharton closes this 
chapter by examining the naturalness of interjections. Quoting from Goffman, 
Darwin (1872), Sapir (1970), he shows that interjections occupy different positions 
along a continuum of naturalness, just as they occupy different positions along the 
showing-meaningNN continuum. Since some of them are instinctive and seem to be 
caused by certain states of mind, they may be viewed as developments of natural 
behaviours and, hence, as more natural (: 99). Other more stylised, iconic 
interjections, on the contrary, combine elements of coding and showing, which 
separate them from both proper cases of showing and saying, respectively (: 100-
101). After this, Wharton very accurately and clearly summarises his answers to 
the questions about interjections. 
 
 
6. “Natural codes” 
 
After introducing what semiotics and the social sciences understand by code, in 
the fifth chapter Wharton (: 107-138) discusses two examples of natural codes –
those used by honeybees and vervet monkeys– and compares them to some human 
natural behaviours –smiles, crying and shivering. He contends that some of these 
behaviours –smiles– carry ‘factive’ meaning, as they indicate something about 
their producers, and may convey messages without reference to their producers’ 
intentions. This does not exclude that in some cases their producers monitor them 
and may consciously produce, fake or exaggerate them, which is possible thanks to 
“[…] the adaptive functions of the behaviours themselves” (: 113). Wharton then 
explains the difference between signs and signals –the latter’s communicative 
function– and argues that some human natural behaviours –e.g. smiles– have 
evolved as signalling activities because they carry or indicate some meaning, 
whilst others –e.g. shivers–  do not work in the same way and are just natural signs 
(: 114-115). Whereas human natural signs must be interpreted in inferential terms, 
human natural signals involve a certain element of coding, for they trigger off 
specific mental or emotional states corresponding to communicators’ mental or 
emotional states (: 115). However, human natural signals are special in that their 
interpretation is also supplemented by inferential processes.  
Next, Wharton reflects on the type of information natural codes convey. In 
order to do so, he comments on the distinction between digital and analogical 
coding, and illustrates that many human behaviours are interpreted analogically on 
the grounds of subtle discriminations of some of their features. Moreover, he states 
that analogue encoding lines up with the Peircean notion of index, i.e. a 
representation related to an object in a proportional or causal way. Nevertheless, he 
also acknowledges that, in addition to the notions of analogue encoding and index, 
something more is necessary to account for “[…] what the information conveyed 
by human natural codes looks like in cognitive terms” (: 122).  
His next step is to review the conceptualist approach to facial expressions, more 
specifically, Wierzbicka’s (2000) analysis in terns of a ‘Natural Semantic 
Metalanguage’. Although he finds points of agreement between this author’s work 
and his view, he finds the same problems mentioned in his review of interjections, 
which stem from Wierzbicka’s basing her analysis on the coding-decoding model 
and relegating inference to a secondary or minor role. He firstly admits that “[…] 
there may be a coded elements to some facial expressions” (: 124), but he contends 
that, for these expressions to communicate, they do not necessarily have to encode 
anything but to be exploited inferentially. Secondly, Wharton considers that the 
conceptual structures with which Wierzbicka characterises facial expressions are 
entirely digital and fall short of capturing what natural codes convey, their context-
dependence and analogicity. Thirdly, he finds it hard to account for what facial 
expressions communicate on the grounds of encoded universal concepts, as, from a 
relevance-theoretic standpoint, not all concepts are lexicalised and, in the case of 
those lexicalised, they must always be narrowed or broadened.  
Finally, Wharton concludes this chapter arguing that, although natural signals 
such as facial expressions and affective tones are not part of a linguistic code, they 
are coded and may be best analysed in non-translational terms, as they do not 
contribute to the truth-conditional content of utterances, do not combine 
compositionally with other elements and are extremely context-dependent. Thus, 
as in the case of interjections, natural signals contribute to the construction of 
higher-level explicatures and convey attitudinal or emotional information (: 128-
131). Therefore, there would be different types of both linguistic and non-linguistic 
devices encoding non-translational information (: 133). Furthermore, he suggests 
that some natural behaviours may make more implicit or explicit contributions to 
communication, so they would also be placed along a continuum of 
explicitness/implicitness, and that they are interpreted by “[…] specialised, perhaps 
dedicated, neural machinery […]” (: 132). 
 
 
7. “Prosody and gesture” 
 
The sixth chapter (: 139-154) is dedicated to two phenomena indispensable to 
understand what we say and our attitudes: prosody and gesture. As regards the 
former, Wharton says that prosodic inputs range from the natural to the linguistic 
and interact with information from different sources. Although their effects highly 
depend on context, prosodic inputs convey information about emotions or attitudes, 
create impressions or alter the salience of some interpretations. Accordingly, 
prosody interacts with lexical items so as to fine-tune their meaning (: 141-142), 
and unexpected stress patterns, costlier in terms of processing effort, divert hearers 
from expectable interpretations towards alternative ones (: 142). Discussing 
Gussenhoven and his colleagues’ ideas about increased articulatory precision, he 
argues that this is a natural sign exploitable in ostensive-inferential communication 
inasmuch as the saliency of the speaker’s effort may attract the hearer’s attention 
towards some assumptions and departures from expected pitch ranges, although 
increasing processing effort, may decrease effort to arrive at intended 
interpretations (: 143-144).  
As in the case of interjections or face expressions, Wharton also puts forward in 
this chapter that both natural and properly linguistic prosodic signals –lexical 
stress, lexical tone and grammaticalised aspects of sentence stress and intonation– 
encode procedural or non-translational information “[…] facilitating the retrieval 
of certain types of syntactic, semantic or conceptual representation” (: 146), and 
jointly interact with other linguistic signals, natural signals and natural signs. 
Nevertheless, he also concedes that all prosodic inputs may not be coded and that 
some of them may only stabilise in some languages or cultures, thus becoming 
emblems, which accounts for cross-cultural variations in their interpretations.  
Concerning gesture, Wharton finds clear correspondences with both the verbal 
and prosodic continua he discusses in previous chapters. On the basis of ‘Kendon’s 
continuum’, which he takes from McNeill (1992), he shows that gestures may 
range from more to less natural too. Thus, we have gesticulation, spontaneous 
movements accompanying speech; language-like gestures, which are integrated 
into speech and contribute to its interpretation; pantomimes, which resemble 
objects or actions; emblems, which are culture-dependent gestures conveying 
positive and negative meanings, and sign languages, which are rule-governed 
languages (: 149-151). Regretting that pragmatics has greatly ignored the role of 
gestures in communication, Wharton argues that the distinctions he traces in the 
book can be extended and applied to the study of gesture from a pragmatic 
viewpoint, as they can be used overtly. Accordingly, he concludes this chapter by 
suggesting that gesticulations are natural signs aimed to help the hearer and, 
therefore, are interpreted inferentially. They may be exploited in ostensive-
inferential communication because they may convey information if the speaker 
uses and shows them intentionally (: 153). 
 
 
8. “Mindreaders” 
 
The seventh and penultimate chapter (: 155-170) underlines the importance that 
the attribution of mental states to other individuals has in both cognition and 
communication, and reviews the extensive literature evidencing mind-reading. 
Wharton devotes some pages to summarise contributions on the consequences that 
impairments in mind-reading abilities have on, e.g. autistics (: 156-158). He also 
underlines Dan Sperber and Deirdre Wilson’s proposal that verbal comprehension 
might be carried out by a mechanism or module forming part of our mind-reading 
ability and specifically dedicated to the interpretation of ostensive stimuli (: 159-
160). After this, he addresses some criticism against relevance-theoretic claims 
about the role of mind-reading by Breheny (2006) and Recanati (2002), and 
provides evidence supporting that in both very basic acts of ostensive-inferential 
communication, in which communicators give direct evidence of their intention to 
inform to their audience, and other acts of ostensive communication in which the 
evidence provided is indirect, attribution of mental states is essential to recognise 
what has been shown and why, as well as what has been said and why, 
respectively.  
Since mind-reading plays such a crucial role in communication, Wharton 
concludes that people having problems reading other individuals’ minds will also 
have problems understanding gestures and other non-verbal behaviours 
intentionally employed in interaction (: 163-164). For this reason, he next reviews 
some experiments that show that autism and right hemisphere damage result in 
problems to understand emotional, attitudinal, inarticulate and intrinsic prosody 
and contrastive stress (: 165-167), and suggests two test cases aimed at 
investigating the prosodic difficulties arising in autism, Asperger’s syndrome and 
right hemisphere damage (: 168).  
9. “The showing-meaningNN continuum and beyond” 
 
Finally, Wharton rounds up his work the last chapter (: 171-194). He starts by 
remarking that the continua proposed by Goffman, Gussenhoven and Kendon are 
based on the code model, whilst the continuum he proposes in this book is based 
on the role played by the inferential attribution of intentions. For this reason, he 
calls the former types of continua ‘Code-continuum’ (C-continuum) and his 
‘Ostensive behaviour-continuum’ (O-continuum) (: 171-172). Both continua 
represent the evidences used in communication, which range from cases of display 
to those of linguistic coding. However, the C-continuum cannot explain how 
communicative behaviours are used and the varied ways in which different 
behaviours can be exploited to convey information. On the contrary, the advantage 
of his O-continuum is its applicability to the elements included in the C-
continuum, as it can account for the ostensive uses of language to display and of 
display to meanNN (: 173). Besides, the O-continuum captures diachronic evolution 
of some phenomena, as “[…] it can represent the fluidity and constant change that 
results in expressions coming to form part of language” (: 174). Nevertheless, as 
Wharton acknowledges, more research is needed so as to elucidate if it “[…] has 
an evolutionary-diachronic as well as a historical-diachronic dimension” (: 175).  
The author goes on to deal with the debate between those who contend that 
communication began as a coding-decoding activity and those who argue that it 
required metarepresentational abilities, and gives sound reasons about why 
metarepresentational abilities might have developed before, independent of 
communication (: 176-179). After this, he also addresses the problem about why 
communication might have stabilised, following Dan Sperber, who argues that this 
might have happened in a panorama in which factors such as the development of 
the human ability to present arguments for conclusions the audience is intended to 
draw or the ability to evaluate the argument of others concurred and laid the 
foundations for the development of complex metarepresentational abilities and a 
logical vocabulary (: 180-183).  
Owing to the manifold uncertainties about the emergence of language, he states 
that we can only account for it in terms of myths, so he then reviews one suggested 
by Grice himself. This myth portrays the evolution of language and communication 
as a sequence of stages in which human beings were able to attribute and recognise 
intentions behind certain behaviours in which they used progressively less direct 
evidences of their intentions until they reached a point at which communication did 
not need to depend on natural connections between ostensive stimuli and intended 
meanings (: 184-190). Finally, Wharton closes this chapter summarising how he 
has answered the initial questions that motivated this book and suggesting that his 
ideas may be extended and applied to other disciplines, such as cognitive science, 
psychology, discourse analysis, sociolinguistics, aesthetics or music. 
10. General assessment 
 
Written with a good style, the book is easily readable and enjoyable. Wharton 
illustrates his main ideas and claims with pertinent examples, most of which are 
contextualised in such a manner that readers can easily visualise what would be 
happening in the situations the author alludes to. But, more importantly, he 
evidences a sound and deep scholarliness not only in relevance-theoretic 
pragmatics and its implications for the analysis of intentional communicative 
phenomena, but also in many of the most influential linguistic models and their 
approaches to interjections, gestures and prosody. This enables him to detect 
weaknesses and inconsistencies in previous analyses and look for alternative, more 
reasonable answers to the problems those linguistic, non-linguistic or paralinguistic 
elements have posed over the history of linguistics. And, honestly, not only does 
Wharton achieve an innovative, brave and systematic re-analysis in coherence with 
the cognitive theoretic pragmatic paradigm he endorses, but also he raises many 
intriguing and stimulating questions, and suggests new and challenging directions 
for future work which will spark off much discussion and research. 
With a good layout and organisation, the book takes readers step by step with 
expositive clarity, concision and precision. Wharton follows a good argumentative 
thread and guides them throughout at every moment by reminding some key 
notions and previous proposals by means of adequate summaries at the end of most 
of its sections and chapters, and by relating ideas when necessary. It could be 
pointed out, however, that the two last chapters, although offering very 
illuminating and clarifying explanations about mind-reading abilities and their 
consequences for communication, as well as a complete survey of the vast 
literature on this topic, may make readers lose track of the general purpose of the 
book, as they centre on these issues a bit excessively and do not relate them very 
much to the usage and understanding of the phenomena analysed. These two 
chapters might have benefitted from (a) section(s) that showed in a more explicit 
way the implications of mind-reading for non-verbal communicative behaviours, 
even if the author lets readers glimpse them in some of their sections. 
One of the remarkable aspects of this book is its simplicity as regards the 
theoretical apparatus with which the author seeks to answer the problems that the 
phenomena under scrutiny pose. Apart from major postulates and concepts of 
relevance-theoretic pragmatics, he relies on the notion of procedural or non-
translational meaning, on the one hand, to account for what interjections, gestures 
and prosody encode and to show how they contribute to the recovery of 
information about attitudes, emotions and feelings. Even if there may not be 
complete agreement about issues such as the procedures that interjections encode, 
their (lack of) conceptual content, or how prosody interacts with interjections and 
lexical items (Padilla Cruz 2009a, 2009b, this issue), and although Wharton does 
not address why the items under scrutiny acquire(d) procedural meaning or how 
such meaning arises, readers with some background in phonetics and phonology 
will discover in this book many challenging insights into the workings of the not-
to-be-despised suprasegmental features of verbal communication which will 
significantly contrast with previous explanations based on the code model of 
communication they might be acquainted with. On the other hand, Wharton’s 
proposals are based on a continuum he envisages as an alternative to other 
continua. The explanatory capacity of this new construct will certainly be welcome 
by scholars and researchers interested in historical linguistics, for it can help to 
gain a better and more complete understanding of the reasons why certain lexical 
items might (have) undergo(ne) semantic change or why certain items evolve(d) in 
different directions over history. 
It is undeniable that a work like Wharton’s will have to be subsequently taken 
into account not only in pragmatics, but also in other linguistic and non-linguistic 
disciplines because of its implications for a the study of human interaction. For 
example, as regards sociolinguistics and anthropological linguistics, practitioners 
in these fields must certainly go a step beyond and consider “[…] the minds of the 
individuals who create […] discourse” (: 193). Maxim-based models of politeness 
like, for instance, Robyn Lakoff’s (1973, 1977) and Geoffrey Leech’s (1983), 
postulated the existence of a number of social maxims that would regulate 
interaction and complete those initially put forward by Grice (1975) in his seminal 
work. Similarly, Fraser and Nolen (1981) and Spencer-Oatey (2000, 2008) have 
argued that interaction is greatly determined by the interlocutors’ rights and 
obligations, among other factors. Although issues such as the origin of those 
maxims, rights and obligations, their ethnocentrism or cultural relativity, how 
individuals internalise them or to what extent they are in fact aware of their 
existence and negotiation may be controversial, those authors’ proposals certainly 
suggest the existence of a pool of cultural or idiosyncratic beliefs that individuals 
entertain, which certainly determine when to say something, what to say, to whom 
and how to say it. The idea that communication is an intentional activity governed 
by beliefs and intentions is not absent from most models of linguistic 
(im)politeness. Indeed, to name probably the best known model, Brown and 
Levinson (1978, 1987), following Grice (1975), already characterised 
communication as a rational activity or behaviour. However, many practitioners of 
politeness theory and sociolinguistics, overwhelmed by the never-ending richness 
of linguistic data and their situation- and individual-specificity, as well as their 
cross-cultural variation, may have a bit excessively focused on the utterance- and 
discourse-level manifestations of communicative behaviour to the neglect of what 
really lies behind: intentionality. If instead of centring on linguistic clues and 
evidences in analyses of the (im)politeness of some (communicative) behaviours, 
attention is paid to the attribution of beliefs interlocutors may make when 
interacting, many descriptions and analyses might drastically change. It is only by 
asking individuals about intentions and reasons that a true and complete 
understanding of the underpinnings of (im)politeness can be gained. 
To conclude, Wharton has made a more than commendable exercise of 
application and extension of relevance theory to an area of communication that, 
with the exception of a few papers and chapters, has received little attention from 
relevance-theory practitioners and pragmatists in general. It is true that relevance-
theoretic pragmatics has many adherents, but also detractors, who might find in 
this book radical claims and extreme positions. Suffice it to mention that a notion 
like procedural meaning has met the opposition and criticism of some authors, for 
whom the very fact that Wharton has based his account on it may be but 
objectionable and censurable. Using the Hegelian conception of history, we might 
be now in an antithesis, in which many communicative phenomena are accounted 
for on the basis of the inferential model of communication and in terms of 
distinctions like the conceptual-procedural one, the thesis being previous, more 
traditional explanations based on the code-model. Other works may follow and 
review Wharton’s; the history of linguistics will go on and there might arise a new 
antithesis that will turn Wharton’s work into a questionable thesis, but his 
contribution will certainly remain as an obligatory reference, as it proves the 
validity of a pragmatic paradigm like relevance theory to satisfactorily account for 
a wide array of communicative phenomena, shows a profound commitment with 
academic rigour and a serious attempt to unveil what underlies the rich expressive 
potential of non-verbal communication. 
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